Dynamics of Asymmetric Territorial Conflict: The Evolution by U. Resnick

By U. Resnick

This e-book offers a complete learn of uneven territorial clash combining online game idea, statistical empirical research and historiographic research. utilizing the Israeli-Palestine clash as a case examine, it checks the version on a database of virtually 400 territorial conflicts.

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Now consider a symmetric version of this game in the sense that capabilities are closely enough matched such that each side has a realistic chance of acquiring territory by force. The following assumptions capture the essence of such a situation: The status quo situation has player 1 in possession of portion θ, and player 2 in possession of portion 1 − θ. • If only one player employs force, this player acquires the entire territory. • If both players employ force, player 1 acquires the entire territory with probability q, while player 2 acquires the entire territory with probability 1 − q.

These changes are then reflected in the rivals’ changing behavior. To analyze the rational decision-making, given a profile of ideas, I employ a dynamic game theory model. To analyze the unconscious process of changing ideas I employ an evolutionary model. I then combine these two models into a single dynamic model which weaves together the domestic and international levels of analysis, much as I believe them to be weaved together in practice. 2 The balance of ‘coercive resources’ Intuitively, it is plausible to expect the division of an object contested between rivals, such as territory, to reflect the overall disposition of resources available to the sides.

This property of the outcome is reminiscent of arguments which point to different levels of ‘motivation’ as something which is likely to have an effect on behavior. For example, it is often argued that strong states sometimes capitulate to weak states since the weak states are more highly motivated. It is comforting that the model is consistent with this basic intuition. 3 Toward an explanation of dynamics Thus far, we have merely devised a way to ‘convert’ rivals’ coercive resources into a division of territory.

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