By Sebastian Edwards, Rudiger Dornbusch
Economists and political scientists from the us and Latin the United States element during this quantity how and why such courses get it wrong and what leads policymakers to continually undertake those rules regardless of a background of failure. Authors research this trend in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru—and convey how Colombia controlled to prevent it. regardless of modifications in how each one kingdom carried out its guidelines, the macroeconomic effects have been remarkably similar.
Scholars of Latin the USA will locate this paintings a worthwhile source, supplying a particular macroeconomic point of view at the carrying on with controversy over the dynamics of populism.
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Additional info for The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America
21 I . Boulder, Colo: Westview. 4 Populist Episodes in Eight Latin American Countries High Populist Countries Low Populist Propensities Argentina Peron (1946-55) Per6n ( 1973-76) Brazil Vargas ( 1951-54) Goulart (1961-64) Sarney (1985-90) Chile Ibadez (1952-58) Allende (1970-73) Peru Belaunde (1963-68) Velasco (1968-75) Garcia (1985-90) Colombia Betancur (1982-86) ~~ ~ Mexico Echevem’a (1970-76) Venezuela PCrez (1974-78) Uruguay Batlle (1954-58) discipline is likely to be greater if the consequences (or perceived consequences) of populist policies have been especially bad.
Lima: Nuevo Mundo. Cavarozzi, Marcelo, and Manuel Antonio Garreton, eds. 1989. Muerte y resurrecidn: Los partidos politicos en el autoritarianisrno y las transiciones del Con0 Sur. Santiago: FLACSO. 34 Robert R. Kaufman and Barbara Stallings Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1990. Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, Trade Unions and the State in Latin America. : Princeton University Press. Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. : Yale University Press.
O For our purposes, however, the crucial question to ask is the extent to which long-term partisan alignments offer incentives for politicians to attempt to form anti-elite coalitions of unions, white-collar employees, and import-substituting industrialists. We argue that these incentives are relatively weak in systems where one or two multiclass parties have provided governmental elites with stable electoral majorities. They have been much stronger in societies where popular-sector groups have been linked to parties that have been systematically excluded from electoral competition and/ or in multiparty systems where competing political elites are unable to organize stable electoral majorities.